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REGIONAL AGENCIES FOR METROPOLITAN AREAS*"
RALPH F. FUCHSt

Except in the 96 metropolitan areas of the United States the
past five years have witnessed the application of several new
plans for the improvement of local government. These have become fairly well standardized. As a result the council-manager
form of county government" bids fair to become established in
numerous localities during the next twenty-five years, much as
the city manager form has been adopted during the past quartercentury. 2 Hence in the administration of existing units of local
government, rural as well as urban, substantial improvement
may be anticipated.
There will remain two problems in relation to the reorganization and consolidation of local units of government which will
continue to give trouble. These are (1) the simple but politically
difficult task of securing county consolidation where conditions
call for it and (2> the tremendously more complex and troublesome problem of creating governmental units in the 96 metropolitan areas which can perform efficiently some of the most important functions that are demanded of public authority in these
regions. Here there are no standardized ideas of proven worth,
nor has there been significant accomplishment in recent years.
There has been, of course, progress in the government of large
cities as well as of small,3 together with the successful accomplishment of specific tasks that have transcended municipal
boundaries. 4 But no metropolitan area has created an agency or
group of agencies that gives promise of continued success in
coping with the body of regional problems or in eliminating
duplication of functions among lesser units of government. And
it is, of course, the handling of functions which are too large
* Address delivered before the Section on Municipal Law of the American Bar Association, August, 1936.
t Professor of Law, Washington University Law School, St. Louis, Mo.
1. See Principles of a Model County Government, 22 Nat. Mun. Rev.
465 (1933).
2. 1936 Mun. Year Book 12.
3. The "Cincinnati Experiment" appears to be coming successfully
through the difficulty created by a city council whose membership is divided
among three factions. 25 Nat. Mun. Rev. 39, 108, 244, 375 (1936).
4. See the achievements of the Port of New York Authority, summarized
in Reed, Metropolitan Areas, 10 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 396, at 398.
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for existing governmental units and the avoidance of overlapping among these units which are at the core of the problem of
metropolitan areas.
The factors which are responsible for the metropolitan-area
problem have been reviewed numerous times.5 In each of these
areas a large population, forming an economic and social unit
with common problems, has spread beyond the boundaries of its
central city, often beyond the confines of a single county, and
occasionally into parts of two or more states. As regards government, not only is there an absence of any local authority
whose sphere extends throughout the area, but over most points
in the region a crazy-quilt of cities, counties, townships, and special districts imposes several layers of official power whose exercise gives rise to conflict and waste.6 Thus, on the whole, many
important matters, such as regional planning, receive no attention from any official agency; many others, such as highway
constructon and maintenance, which obviously should be unified for the area, are inadequately carried on by agencies whose
jurisdiction is more restricted; and still others, such as police
administration, suffer not only from lack of unity but also from
conflict of authority.
There have been various types of proposals for simplifying
this governmental maze and caring for the needs of metropolitan
areas in fairly comprehensive fashion. These have been classified
as (1) annexation of adjoining areas to the principal city; (2)
elimination of county government within the central city, at the
same time enlarging the latter, or consolidation of city and
county governments; (3) expansion of county functions to meet
metropolitan needs; (4) creation of special authorities, or districts, additional to, previous governmental units, to perform
specific functions; (5) establishment of "federated" metropolitan governments, comprising a "greater" city and semi-independ5. See, for recent examples, Reed, supra, note 4; National Municipal
League, The Government of Metropolitan Areas (1930) c. I; Merriam,

Parratt & Lepawsky, The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago (1933) c. I.
6. Gill & Jones, Metropolitan Districts, 1936 Mun. Year Book 135;
Merriam, Parratt & Lepawsky, supra, note 5, at 9, enumerating 1642

governments in the metropolitan region of Chicago. Of these 978 are
school districts. The total was slightly reduced in 1933 by the consolidation

of 21 of the 70 park districts into the Chicago Park District. Ill. Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 105, sec. 333.1 et seq.
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ent lesser units which are integrated with it; and (6) independent statehood for the largest metropolitan areas.7 All of these
proposals except the last have received application in one or
more metropolitan areas in the United States, but nowhere with
sufficient inclusion of territory and also of functions to answer
the requirements of the situation created through the spread of
industry and population made possible by the automobile., In
the meanwhile obstacles to the enlarged application of any of
these ideas have appeared. Settled areas and rural sections are
interspersed in the newer metropolitan regions, and incorporated
communities not immediately adjoining the principal cities retain an intense local patriotism which resists the assumption by
metropolitan units of the functions of their governments.0 The
problem of unified and simplified government for metropolitan
areas at the present time, therefore, presents the four-fold aspect
of (1) performing essential functions efficiently where they are
needed throughout the area; (2) avoiding the complexity and
cost of urban government in rural sections; (3) permitting a
continuance of local municipal governments so far as possible;
and (4) distributing the cost of government within the area
upon an acceptable basis.
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that the creation of
a new type of special authority, or district, having limited functions over the entire metropolitan area but having also the capacity to absorb additional functions, presents a more hopeful
method of solving the governmental problem in these areas than
any of the proposals just mentioned, because, first, it would dis7. Gill, Intergovernmental Arrangements, 1936 Mun. Year Book 140;
National Municipal League, supra, note 5.
8. Annexation, of course, is the traditional method of providing city
government for outlying territory which needs it. In several important
cities, such as Denver, St. Louis, and Philadelphia, county government has
been eliminated. In Los Angeles County, California, Wayne County, Michigan, containing the city of Detroit, and elsewhere the counties have assumed important functions of a municipal nature. In Boston, New York,
and elsewhere special districts or "authorities" for the performance of
functions which transcend municipal boundaries have been established. In
the case of New York City the present government, with its boroughs, provides an approach to "federalism" with, however, much less independence
for the boroughs than proposals elsewhere have contemplated. The metropolitan area of New York is now much larger than even the consolidated
city. See National Municipal League, supra, note 5, 68, 171, 217, 256, 344,
367.
9. Reed, supra, note 4.

19361

METROPOLITAN AREAS

turb fewer vested interests of a political, economic, or sentimental nature and would therefore prove easier of adoption; second,
it would provide for later development; and, third, it would
avoid the necessity of introducing compromises into the essence
of the plan such as are likely to create fatal complexity or dangerous weakness in proposals for federated metropolitan government. 9'
The prototypes of the suggested form of authority are the
special-purpose districts now existing in a number of metropolitan areas. All of these derive in a sense from the Metropolitan
Police District of London, established in 1829.10 Of those which
function today in the United States the earliest and, together
with the Port of New York Authority, the most famous are the
Metropolitan District Commission of the Boston area and the
Chicago Sanitary District. Both the latter and the predecessors
of Lhe former began their existence in 1899.1 Another noteworthy example is the Metropolitan Transit District in the Boston area, established in 1929.12 Earlier than any of these were
the South Park Commission, the West Park Commission, and
the Lincoln Park Board in Chicago, which were succeeded in
1933 by the Chicago Park Commission. 13 The jurisdiction of
this commission, however, does not extend beyond the present
boundaries of the city of Chicago. 4
The Metropolitan District Commission as at present organized
is composed of a Commissioner, who is the executive officer, and
four Associate Commissioners, appointed by the Governor, 5 and
charged with the functions of providing main sewers, water, and
parks and boulevards within sewer, water, and park districts
respectively. The boundaries of these districts, while they are
not identical, embrace in each instance the major portion of the
Boston metropolitan area.'0 The Commission has power to enact
9a. See infra, note 54.
10. Reed, supra, note 4. The District, however, is a department of the
central government, with a commissioner at its head and without local responsibility. Fosdick, European Police Systems (1915) 40-48.
11. National Municipal League, supra, note 5, at 260. The District Commission is the successor since 1919 of separate sewer, water, and park districts. Ibid., 274.
12. Mass. Acts & Res., 1929, c. 383.
13. Il. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 105, sec. 333.1 et seq.
14. Idem, sec. 333.1a.
15. Mass. Gen. Laws (Terc. ed., 1932) c. 28, secs. 1-3.
16. Idem, c. 92, secs. 1, 10, 33, 35.
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regulations, which receive civil and penal enforcement, relating
to the water supply,17 the parks, boulevards, and adjacent
waters, 18 and the Charles River basin,"' It maintains a police
force which has the powers of town police.20 It has independent
authority to deal with public utilities in reference to the location
and maintenance of tracks, lines, etc. 21 Administratively the
Commissioner is authorized to establish divisions of the Commission in his discretion, each headed by a director appointed by
him with the consent of the Governor and Council. 22 Other officers and employees are appointed by the Commission.23 The expenses of the Commission are met from the proceeds of assessments against the cities and towns within the districts, apportioned for various purposes according to assessed valuation,
population, or consumption of water.24 The Treasurer of the
Commonwealth administers the funds. The scope of the Commission's operations may be gauged by its annual expenditures,
amounting to slightly over $5,300,000 in 1934.2 In that year it
had 1345 permanent employees, including 218 police, and 864
temporary employees. Its net debt on November 30, 1934,
amounted to slightly over $21,000,000.26
The five Commissioners of the Chicago Park District are appointed by the Mayor of the City and are constituted a "body
politic and corpotate." 27 They receive no compensationY.2 The
Chicago Sanitary District, which also is denominated a body corporate, is governed by nine elected Trustees, three being chosen
each two years for six-year terms.29 Each district is established
for a single purpose, indicated by its name, the Park District
having charge of the extensive system of parks within the City, 0
and the Sanitary District being entrusted with the establish17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Idem, secs. 20, 21.
Idem, secs. 37, 39.
Idem, sec. 38.
Idem, c. 28, sec. 4; c. 92, sec. 61.
Idem, c. 92, secs. 43-46.
Idem, c. 28, sec. 3.
Idem, see. 4.
Idem, c. 92, secs. 5, 6, 26, 54, 55.
Annual Report of the Commission, 1934.
Ibid.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 105, sec. 333.3.
Idem, sec. 333.4.
Idem, c. 42, sec. 322.
The City itself maintains a number of playgrounds and small parks.
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ment and conduct of sewerage and drainage works which extend
beyond the confines of Chicago itself but do not embrace the
entire metropolitan area. The Sanitary District exercises important incidental functions in connection with navigation,
power production, highways, and recreation.3" The Trustees of
the Sanitary District elect a chairman from among their own
number who may exercise a veto over their acts, which is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds majority of the Trustees.
Their principal administrative officers are a clerk, a treasurer,
a chief engineer, and an attorney.3 1 The Park District is provided with a statutory chief executive, known as the General
Superintendent, who is supposed to be chosen upon the basis of
technical qualifications. He must, however, be a resident of the
District and his powers are derived from the Commissioners."
Both districts have power to enact ordinances to aid in effecting
their statutory purposes. 3 They may also maintain police
forces3 They have extensive powers to borrow money, to levy
taxes and special assessments, and in general to manage their
own finances.35
The Boston Metropolitan Transit District presents several suggestive features in its organization.- Its Board of Trustees is
composed of five members, four of whom are appointed by the
Governor and one by the Mayor of Boston. Its functions are
those of planning the construction and financing by the District,
with the approval of the General Court, of transit facilities for
the metropolitan area. The territory and inhabitants of the District are constituted a body corporate. The Board is advised by
a Metropolitan Transit Council, composed of the mayors and
chairmen of the boards of selectmen of the cities and towns included in the District. The District has authority to take over
transit properties owned by the City of Boston when the City
shall see fit to transfer them and to establish a Metropolitan
Transit Department of three Commissioners to administer these
30a.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
333.21,
36.

Merriam, Parratt & Lepawsky, supra, note 5, at 55-56.
I1. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 42, sec. 323.
Idem, c. 105, secs. 333.5, 333.6.
Idem, c. 42, sec. 323; c. 105, sec. 333.7.
Idem, c. 42, sec. 360; c. 105, secs. 333.7, 334.
Idem, c. 42, secs. 328, 332, 333; c. 105, secs. 333.16, 333.19, 333.20,
333.29-37, 333.38-41.
Mass. Acts & Res., 1931, c. 383.
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properties as well as others newly created. At present the City's
properties are leased to the privately-owned Boston Elevated
Railway and operated by a public Board of Trustees created by
state law. This operating arrangement will continue until 1959.7
Thus, should the District develop into an agency for actually
conducting the transit services of the metropolitan area, it Would
in effect be composed of a division of planning and construction,
an operating division, and an advisory council representative of
the interested municipalities.
The recently created London Passenger Transport Board,
which conducts most of the transportation services in the London
area, has an advisory committee which is representative of the
sections of that area and also of various affected interests such
as private transportation agencies and transport labor.38 The
committee participates through a representative in the selection
of the members of the Transport Board itself" and has extensive
40
powers of investigation into the affairs of the Board.
Thus, taken together, even these few among the fairly numerous metropolitan "authorities" 41 embody most of the essential
features of modern municipal government. Responsible boards
or councils; single executives; departmentalized administration;
functions both of a public-works nature and of day-to-day administration; dblegated legislative powers; and relative financial autonomy all appear in the picture. Only the enforcement
of ordinances by proceedings in municipal courts appears to be
lacking. Clearly authorities of this sort are possible candidates
for the performance of numerous functions in the larger metropolitan areas. It remains to be determined whether they have
weaknesses which cannot be overcome and whether there are in
fact reasons for preferring them to other suggested agencies.
It must be admitted that no single authority thus far created
meets the requirements of a metropolitan government with numerous and varied functions. It has been pointed out that most
of the existing districts are utility districts which are successful
37. Idem, c. 333.
38. 23 & 24 Geo. V, c. 14, sec. 58 (1933).
39. Idem, sec. 1.
40. Idem, sec. 60, supplementing 14 & 15 Geo. V, c. 34, see. 3.
41. The report of the National Municipal League, supra, note 5, lists 24
districts which extended beyond the boundaries of cities in the United
States and Canada in 1930.
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in the exercise of the specific projects entrusted to them partly
because of the specialization and singleness of purpose which the
limited scope of these activities makes possible. 42 Beyond that,
it is said, they have not engaged in constructive activity or built
up the interest and loyalty of their constituencies. "Special
metropolitan authorities have distinct limitations. They are essentially a makeshift. They do not offer a conclusive answer to
the problem of integration of government of metropolitan
areas."48
It may be suggested in reply to the foregoing that special
metropolitan authorities so far have been charged simply with
the performance of specific tasks. For that reason their potentialities are untested. The Metropolitan District Commission has
been kept in leading strings by the legislature, and its stateappointed Commissioner and Associates doubtless have seemed
far removed from the people of the Boston area. 44 The Chicago
Sanitary District, on the other hand, has a task at present which
challenges the imagination, 5 and its Board of Trustees is elected
by the people of the District. Its organization, however, is without benefit of those features of modern municipal government
which make for successful functioning." The political manipulation and scandals that have resulted, coming to light in recent
years, have done much to kill whatever popular enthusiasm
might otherwise have been engendered by its achievements in
7
the service of health, decency, and esthetics.4
The most pressing needs for metropolitan-area government at
the present time are said to be community planning, including
provision for streets, parks, and recreational facilities; sewerage
42. National Municipal League, supra, note 5, 282, 337.

43. Idem, 341.
44. Idem, 313-315.

45. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, holding
illegal the diversion of sufficient water from Lake Michigan to dilute Chicago's sewage and send it down the Illinois River, makes mandatory the

construction of sewage disposal works for the greater part of the affected
population. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367 (1929), 281 U. S. 179, 696
(1930), 289 U. S. 395, 710 (1933); Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 42,
sees. 326, 327a.
46. Especially regrettable is the absence of an individual executive, or
chief administrator, with statutory powers. The addition of a civil service
system to the district's legislative charter in 1935 may or may not prove
salutary, according to its administration. Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935)

c. 42, sees. 323.1-323.36.
47. National Municipal League, supra, note 5, 318-319.
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and utilities; safety, including police and health; and eleemosynary institutions, including public schools. 8 No reason appears
why in any area an authority might not be set up with a councilmanager form of government, for the performance of some or
all of these functions and of additional ones which might from
time to time be added. Presumably the council, or board, of such
an authority would be elected, but whether by proportional representation or by single-member districts within the metropolitan area would depend upon whether the functions of the authority were such as to raise issues that promised to divide the inhabitants along group lines. The provision of streets and highways, for example, probably is too largely a technical question
to raise such issues, whereas the affording of park and recreational facilities raises questions of occasional large-scale expenditure and of relative treatment of racial and neighborhood
groups that may well arouse interest and create division in the
population. Ultimately, it would seem, the authority should have
a council or board chosen by proportional representation, either
from the area at large or from districts which are represented
on the council by several members."" There should be, in addition,
a manager responsible to the council but with independent statutory or charter powers.P0 A law department or attorney, a department of finance, a department of civil service, and other departments established by ordinance as the functions of the authority demand, with heads appointed by the manager and responsible to him, should likewise be provided for.5 ' An advisory
council, such as those referred to above, might prove a valuable
addition.
As regards functions, provision for a planning commission,
related to the council and to the governing agencies of all municipalities within the area, but probably without compulsion attaching to the observance of its plans, undoubtedly should be
made. 52 Other functions, involving the exercise of compulsory
48. Reed, supra, note 4.
49. See National Municipal League, Model City Charter (revised ed.,
1927) p. 10, note 1, for a discussion of the relative merits of these two plans.
50. Idem, 33-35.
51. Idem, 35.
52. Idem, 71-74. The Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission
has had within it since 1923 a Division of Metropolitan Planning, consisting
of seven commissioners. Mass. Gen. Laws (Terc. ed., 1932) c. 28, sees. 5, 6.

1936]

METROPOLITAN AREAS

powers, should be selected as the needs and possibilities of the
particular situation seem to demand. Those listed above as of
major importance in metropolitan areas at present53 are too numerous and far-reaching to be transferred at one time from established governmental agencies. The recent Pittsburgh and St.
Louis plans for federated metropolitan government have been
very much more cautious and nevertheless have failed to win
adoption. 54 There is, however, only a modest minimum below

which so unassuming an agency as an authority could not afford
to fall. The merit of the plan, if it has any, lies in the fact that
it would make slight pretensions at the outset and would seek
to win its way into the confidence of the inhabitants until in time,
53. Supra, text at note 48.
54. The Pittsburgh plan, which failed of adoption in 1929, would have
been accepted had not the excessive requirement of a two-thirds vote in a
majority of the affected municipalities been included in the constitutional
amendment under which the proposal was submitted by the legislature. The
proposal was approved by simple majorities in a comfortable preponderance
of these municipalities. In a sense, therefore, the fate of the measure
might be regarded as a favorable augury for similar proposals elsewhere,
submitted under more reasonable requirements. The larger satellite cities
in the Pittsburgh area, however, rejected the proposal by heavy majorities.
Faust, Voters Turn Thumbs Down on Pittsburgh's Metropolitan Charter,
18 Nat. Mun. Rev. 529 (1929); Miller, The Pittsburgh Consolidation Charter, idem, 603. The plan as presented was greatly weakened in comparison
with that originally drafted. Briefly, it proposed the abolition of Allegheny
County and the substitution of an enlarged City of Pittsburgh. In addition
to the county functions, the City, throughout the area, was to provide main
streets, exercise planning and zoning powers subject to the ordinances of
municipal subdivisions, establish special taxing and assessment districts
where needed, enact health regulations, and maintain a police department.
Faust, op. cit. The St. Louis plan never was fully elaborated in public. A
state constitutional enabling amendment, specifying some of its features,
was defeated in 1930, receiving a favorable vote in the City of St. Louis but
an adverse vote in St. Louis County, which surrounds the City but does not
include it, and in the State as a whole. The features set forth in the amendment included the establishment of a City of Greater St. Louis, including
both the present City and the County; the continuance of existing municipalities under the name of municipal districts; the abolition of the existing
county government and the substitution of incorporated "county districts"
in the previously unincorporated portions of the County. The Greater City,
however, was to perform many of the previous county functions of government. The amendment specifically contemplated control by the Greater City
of tax assessment and collection or at least equalization within its boundaries; the maintenance of a separate police force for the Greater City; the
creation within the Greater City of special improvement districts; and the
vesting of additional powers previously exercised by municipalities, upon
favorable action by a majority of the voters within a majority of the affected municipalities. The reduction of the enabling measure to legal form
required a horrendous proposal of over four thousand words for incorporation into the State constitution, which was rejected partly because of fear
of unknown evils which it might contain.
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perhaps, it developed into a full-fledged municipality of metropolitan proportions. A sufficient beginning might be made, for
example, with the provision of through highways and main
sewers and the establishment of a police department covering
the metropolitan area but replacing the local police, sheriffs, or
constables only where the authorities or the inhabitants of local
municipalities, counties, or townships consented. The assumption of additional functions, of which the provision of parks,
health regulation, and the conduct of hospitals and correctional
institutions might well be among the earliest, should, of course,
be provided for in advance. Entry upon a new function in its
larger aspects might be by vote of the people, with concurrent
favorable majorities required in the area as a whole, in the principal city, in a majority of the lesser municipalities, and in the
county or counties outside the principal city. It should be provided in addition that the authority, by contract with lesser units
of government within its area, might undertake to perform local
services, such as the provision of local streets, sewers, parks,
and recreational facilities, and to carry on local police and health
regulation within their area. 5
Financial arrangements would necessarily include general taxation for the support of the authority's broader functions, special assessments-for improvements which the council determined
to be of particular benefit to property in specified areas, and
payments by lesser governmental units for local services rendered to them. There would, presumably, be a maximum tax
rate for authority purposes which would be additional to the
rates allowed to the local municipalities and counties or townships. There would be little opportunity for piling rate upon rate
except to an extent which is already possible under existing governmental arrangements. Even in the rural portions of populous counties it is commonly possible now for highway, sewer,
school, road, and hospital districts to be established in addition
55. The writer was not present at the presentation by Mr. Gordon Whitnail of his paper, Reorganization and Consolidation of Units of Local Government, at the 1935 meeting of the American Bar Association's Section of
Municipal Law, published in the summary of the Section's proceedings, p.
85. It may be that the proposal therein made, for metropolitan services to
be rendered throughout an area according to a minimum standard, supplemented by improved services where desired by the inhabitants of localities,
involves the same idea.
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to the general governments or for special taxes to be levied for
the same purposes.
One additional power may be necessary in a metropolitan district which extends beyond a single county. That is the equalization of assessments, to avoid the underpayment of taxes to
the authority through a scaling down of assessed valuations such
as the states have not succeeded in preventing. Far better, of
course, would be the assumption by the authority of the entire
function of tax assessment. Equalization should be for state as
well as local purposes, but if such a proposal should prove to be
the stumbling-block to the acceptance of a plan for a metropolitan district, it might be possible to abandon consistency and
morality and to propose equalization for the purposes of the
authority alone, as was provided in the alternative in the St.
Louis plan of 1930.56
It may be asked at this point wherein the proposal just outlined for metropolitan authorities differs from the plans for
federated metropolitan governments to which reference has been
made, or from the modernization of county government accompanied by an enlargement of county functions to include some
which are of a municipal nature. The differences perhaps do
not go to the essence of the governmental scheme but have to do
rather with the incidentals and with the strategy of securing
adoption. The metropolitan authority would be added to existing governments in its area and would offer a minimum of immediate disturbance to any of them. The opposition engendered
by its proposal consequently would not be so likely to include
county officials or other persons with vested interests of a political or sentimental nature. Since county government would
remain, there would be no need for incorporated districts in the
rural sections of the metropolitan area.57 Judicial administration; the prosecution of offenders; the provision of local streets,
roads, sewers, and parks; the conduct of schools, libraries, and
fire departments; the collection of taxes; and local zoning, licensing, and police protection, would continue as before. There would
simply be introduced a new unit of government whose cost at the
beginning would not be high and whose efficiency in the long run
56. Proposed amendment to article IX of the Constitution of Missouri
(1930) sub-sec. 3(3).
57. Supra, note 54.
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might lower the expense of government in the metropolitan area
as additional functions were absorbed and the expenditures of
local units correspondingly reduced. At least it is likely that
larger functions would be performed at a cost no more than
commensurate with the benefits conferred.
The boundaries of such a suggested metropolitan authority
could be drawn independently of the limits of existing counties,
leaving the excluded fringes still parts of unimpaired units. If
in the course of time the counties should seek to surrender functions to the metropolitan authority which needed to be performed
in those portions of their area excluded from the authority, steps
might be taken for the annexation of such areas to adjoining
counties or arrangements be made for the authority's exercising
these functions outside its own boundaries.r8 In defining the
boundaries of the metropolitan authority the best possible approximation to workability would have to be sought. Obviously
the needs for transportation, sewerage, police protection, and
other services would not all extend equally far. Boundaries
which varied for different purposes, as in the case of the Metropolitan District Commission, would scarcely be practicable for
a larger number of activities supported by general taxation. If
the area were made large, however, the support of the broader
services performed by the authority would scarcely prove burdensome, in view of the charges against lesser units for local
services and the use of special assessments to finance improvements which did not promise to confer a benefit throughout the
area.
In some instances, of course, where county boundaries and
metropolitan area boundaries coincide, a federated city or a modernized county may equally as well be made the regional unit
of government. At least in the former case, however, it may be
doubted whether equal simiplicity of function at the outset is
possible. The creation of a "greater" city implies pretensions
and leads to elaborateness which, while they arouse enthusiasm
among the boosters, frighten the sober citizenry. Concern over
census standing, which has figured in attempts to set up larger
cities under the federated schemes, hardly extends below the
58. Intergovernmental arrangements for the performance of specific local functions are becoming increasingly common. Gill, Intergovernmental
Arrangements, 1935 Mun. Year Book, 140.

19361

METROPOLITAN AREAS

first ten or twelve cities in any event and is likely to become a
diminishing factor as the period of expanding population yields
to an era of stability. 59 Possibly it is something more than aca-

demic detachment which leads to the belief that a realistic urging of metropolitan-area government in terms of the actual benefit to be derived would win acceptance more readily than exhortation in terms of meaningless statistical rivalry. 60
It requires considerable hardihood to suggest an addition to
the units of local government in this day and age, even as a
means to the end of ultimate simplification. More especially is
this true when the proposed addition is denominated a district
or an authority. 1 In all fairness, however, there should be differentiation between districts whose purpose is simply the evasion of constitutional tax limits or of limitations upon the indebtedness of cities and counties while loading new obligations upon
the same land, 62 and districts which either derive their income
from the sale of services 3 or which can be justified by considerations of economy and efficiency. The proposed metropolitan authorities clearly belong in the latter category. If they should be
successful they would increasingly absorb small, inefficient governmental units whose expenditures and indebtedness impose
much financial burden without compensating benefits.
Legal methods of introducing metropolitan authorities and
legal obstacles standing in the way vary, of course, from state
to state. It is not the purpose here to discuss these in detail. In
states like Massachusetts and Illinois, where the home-rule tradition is lacking, it might be well to proceed by legislative action
after the removal of whatever constitutional restrictions prevent
the delegation of city or county functions to a new type of
agency.64 Elsewhere there might be legislative prescription of
59. Recent Social Trends in the United States (1933) 48-56.

60. See Faust, Miller, supra, note 54.
61. Porter, A Plague of Special Districts, 22 Nat. Mun. Rev. 544 (1933);
Davis, Borrowing Machines, 24 idem 328 (1935). Compare, however, Foley,
Legal Problems Affecting the Non-Federal Phases of the Public Works Program, Proc. A. B. A. Sec. of Mun. Law, 1935, p. 29; P. W. A. and Revenue
Financing of Public Enterprises, idem, 51; Some Recent Developments in
the Law Relating to Municipal Financing of Public Works, 4 Ford. L. Rev.
13 (1935).
62. As in the case of districts for the construction of public improvements which are to be paid for by special assessments.
63. As in the case of the Port of New York Authority and numerous
bridge and utility districts throughout the country.
64. People ex rel. v. Becker, 203 N. Y. 201, 96 N. E. 381 (1911).
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area boundaries, followed by authorized home-rule procedure in
the formulation of a scheme of government, subject to the same
necessity for eliminating constitutional restrictions. In Missouri,
with which the writer is familiar, constitutional home-rule provisions might prevent the transfer of certain functions to a
metropolitan authority, 6 while the provision in the same document for certain county officers 7 might ultimately give trouble.
The constitutionality of proportional representation, moreover,
is at best doubtful.6 8 The simplest way around these pitfalls, if
its adoption could be secured, would be a constitutional enabling
amendment for defined metropolitan areas, which necessarily
would supersede prior obstructive provisions.
In some metropolitan areas, which extend beyond a single
state, a complete solution could be found only by means of an
interstate compact. To give effect to such a compact, state constitional amendments would be necessary to the same extent as
for legislation conferring similar powers.
The setting up of governments for metropolitan areas is constitution-making in fact if not in name. Its product should not
depart too far from the familiar or become involved in a maze
of detail. At the same time the concepts which underlie it must
be sufficiently bold to meet the situation and provision must be
made for their realization through growth, without compromises
that sacrifice fundamentals. To steer a course which is guided
by these principles is difficult. It seems not too much to hope,
however, that with governmental experts to do the navigating,
lawyers to steer the ship away from rocks of technical invalidity
and shoals of popular opposition, and all hands to man the machinery, the port of efficient, economical government may be
reached-even if no speed records are broken.
65. Mo. Const. (1875) art. X, sec. 10; art. IX, secs. 16, 20-25. Compare
art. IX, sec. 15.
66. See, however, State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 S. V. (2d)
713 (1928); State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 910, 1 S. W. (2d) 1021
(1928).
67. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, secs. 8, 10.
68. Fischer & Grossman, The Constitutionality of Proportional Representation as Applied to Elections in the State of Missouri, 18 ST. LOUIS
LAW REV. 16 (1932).

